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This paper aims to investigate the transition to a new energy system based on hydrogen in 
the European liberalized framework. After analyzing the literature on the hydrogen 
infrastructure needs in Europe, we estimate the size and scope of the transition challenge. 
We take the theoretical framework of network economics to analyze early hydrogen 
infrastructure needs. Therefore, several concepts are applied to hydrogen economics such 
as demand club effects, scale economies on large infrastructures, scope economies, and 
positive socio-economical externalities. On the examples of the electricity and natural gas 
industry formation in Europe, we argue for public intervention in order to create conditions to 
reach more rapidly the critical size of the network and to prompt network externalities 















































Hydrogen produced from renewable sources and used in fuel cells for different 
applications has the potential to revolutionize the future energy sector in a 
sustainable way. Today, 65 % of global CO2 emissions come from energy uses, 21 
% from transportation due to its dependence on fossil fuels. (WRI, 2006) Moreover, 
the emissions from transportation are expected to rise in the coming years, 
particularly in developing countries. The introduction of hydrogen and fuel cells, 
particularly in transportation, has the potential to curb radically greenhouse gas 
emissions, as well as to reduce the dependency on fossil fuels and improve air 
quality in the cities. (Barreto et al, 2003)   
Even though hydrogen production is still more costly compared to other fuels – 
particularly gasoline for transportation – recent technological advances in production 
and higher oil prices have improved hydrogen’s economics. (NRC, 2004) Recently, 
many fuel cell producers have announced that the cost of fuel cells is approaching a 
competitive level, and demonstration projects are already on the road throughout the 
world.
i (Ballard, 2007; IEA, 2004) Nevertheless, infrastructure availability is required 
before that hydrogen and fuel cell technology can be diffused into the market 
(especially for transportation). Without infrastructure there will be no demand for 
hydrogen and fuel cell technology, and automotive companies will be unwilling to 
supply fuel cell cars. On the other hand, without demand there will be no private 
agents interested in building up the infrastructure. This is the so-called “chicken-or-
egg” dilemma. (Sperling and Cannon, 2004) 
The infrastructure problem is not new in the history of network industries. Several 
examples show that new infrastructures are built when required to overcome a 
national “strategic need.” This was the case of interconnections for 
telecommunications, railways for trains, and even the electricity grid and natural gas 
pipelines in the energy sector. Each of these infrastructures has in common high 
initial costs with large uncertainties in demand uptake and the recovery period, which 
makes it unlikely that private agents will be interested in pursuing the investments at 
a national level. Hence, traditionally the State built networks using the argument of 
common interest. (Angelier, 2007; Bergougnoux, 2000) 
In the newly liberalized European framework, financial burdens and international 
competition rules make it almost impossible for the government to build a new energy 
infrastructure on its own. At the same time, it is still unclear how the market will 
provide the investment needed to build the infrastructure and who will organize it. 
This paper aims to discuss the early hydrogen infrastructure transition in a market 
framework. More precisely, we focus on the following questions: How does the 
infrastructure evolve; what should be the role of public authorities leading up to the 
transition?   
Numerous studies have focused in identifying the optimum decisions for hydrogen 
transitions (Plotkin, 2007), but very few have tackled explicitly industrial organization 
issues. We analyze hydrogen as a network industry. Our analyses cover the 









































8demand behavior. The electricity and natural gas experience in Europe provides 
empirical ground for the discussion. Finally, we argue that public intervention is 
required in order to promote the new energy system. 
 
1. Hydrogen infrastructure challenges 
Hydrogen is the most plentiful gas in the universe but it only exists in nature 
associated with other elements from which it has to be extracted. So, like electricity, 
hydrogen is an energy carrier. It must be produced from a primary source and 
transmitted to the consumption place in order to deliver an energy service (stationary, 
mobile, portable) using fuel cells technology for higher efficiency. (IEA, 2005) An 
infrastructure for production and delivery is therefore required. In the case of mobile 
applications, hydrogen stations have to be provided also in a sufficient number, and 
must be appropriately distributed between premium and non-premium locations. 
(Melaina, 2003) In order to solve the "chicken-or-egg" problem, investors in fuel 
distribution, hydrogen production and vehicle manufacturing have to rely on each 
other’s investments to start the system successfully. Furthermore, supply and 
demand should evolve together in order to reduce uncertainty and costs.  
The issue in the transition period is to match an infrastructure sufficiently to enable 
the hydrogen consumption, of which evolution is very uncertain. In the beginning, 
hydrogen may use the existing energy infrastructure, particularly a natural gas one 
(transmission, feedstock supply, etc.). Moreover, current hydrogen producing plants 
could make available hydrogen surplus to the first consumption centers nearby (e.g. 
at refineries near the city limits). (Ogden, 1999b) Where new infrastructure must be 
fully constructed, first networks might be decentralized and hydrogen produced on 
site. (Ogden, 1999a) Although small scale hydrogen appliances can get the 
infrastructure started, investors might not be interested in investing in new equipment 
that becomes obsolete before being repaid. Incentives should therefore target these 
essential but unattractive investments. (Plotkin, 2007)  
Meanwhile, demand expansion can justify building up a large production unit (scale 
economies and cheap feedstock prices) and establish the delivery infrastructure to 
bring the hydrogen to the consumption point. (Ogden, 1999a; Yang and Ogden, 2007) 
Regional specificities such as feedstock prices and demand density will determine 
the choice of the pathway, so the transition might look different from region to region. 
(Plotkin, 2007) The infrastructure (production, delivery and fuel stations) should be 
built incrementally in order to avoid investing in overcapacity which can increase the 
hydrogen price. (Melaina, 2003; Yang and Ogden, 2005) Even if there is no sufficient 
demand in the medium term, the economics of large hydrogen plants can still be 
improved if there are other uses for the hydrogen such as ammonia manufacturing or 
market for heat and power. (Ogden, 1999a)  
In its vision for hydrogen in Europe, the High Level Group (HLG, 2003) considers the 
following market penetration in the transport sector: 5 % of all new cars by 2020 (or 2 
% of the fleet by that time); 25 % by 2030 (or 15 % of the fleet); and 35 % by 2040 (or 
32 % of the fleet). Many studies have followed trying to estimate infrastructure costs 









































8The “HyWays" project is the largest analysis of the hydrogen infrastructure done for 
Europe. (Stiller et al., 2007) In 2007, the consortium presented a roadmap for the 
hydrogen introduction in Europe. The analysis takes into account, firstly, the profile of 
each member state in terms of infrastructure, domestic resources, socio-economic 
factors, etc.;  and secondly, the objectives of the European policy particularly in terms 
of hydrogen penetration, CO2 emissions reduction, diversification of the energy mix, 
and incorporation of renewable resources. The total investment cost at the end of 
Phase III (2027) was estimated to 60 billion euros. It was also reported that hydrogen 
has the potential to halve CO2 emissions and reduce by 40 % oil consumption in 
transportation in Europe by 2050. 
Other studies were performed in order to estimate the cost of the hydrogen 
infrastructure for Europe. The main results and assumptions are shown in table 1. 
The analyses confirm the need for large investments.  
Table 1 Synthesis of results of hydrogen infrastructure studies for Europe 
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8In addition to the infrastructure challenge, technology costs must be substantially 
reduced in the coming years so as to make hydrogen competitive with energy 
substitutes. This is the conclusion of the hydrogen prospective study, WETO-H2 
(2007), which in the reference scenario (maintaining of the current trends) forecasts 
that hydrogen will not exceed 2 % of global energy consumption in 2050 (3 % in 
Europe). In the "hydrogen" scenario, characterized by carbon constraints and very 
optimistic assumptions concerning costs reductions in fuel cells, the proportion of 
hydrogen in the final energy consumption will not exceed 13 % and 7 %, respectively. 
Hydrogen can be produced from renewable electricity and become virtually “carbon 
free”. Nevertheless, the low renewable electricity available in the medium term would 
save more greenhouse gas emissions by replacing old cold-fired power plants than 
by producing hydrogen for transportation. (Plotkin, 2007) Hence, it is likely that 
hydrogen will be first produced from fossil fuels until renewable technologies become 
more competitive, which is not expected to happen until 2030. (HLG, 2003) The 
transition for the hydrogen economy is therefore dependent on the progress done in 
both the carbon capture and storage technologies, and in the renewable technologies.  
In conclusion, entry and penetration of hydrogen into the market depends critically on 
the existence of the infrastructure. The necessary investments are very expensive 
especially as uncertainties persist in technology and on demand behavior. In this too 
risky context, it seems unlikely that private companies (oil, gas, electricians, 
automakers, industrial gas companies, etc.) will take over the investments alone, 
without any public support. 
 
2. The economics of network industries 
2.1 Network externalities 
A Network is a spatial interconnection of activities and equipment technically 
compatible. (Economides, 1995) Network industries are characterized by the 
presence of network externalities. These external effects can be generated directly 
by increasing demand (the club effects), or indirectly by declining commodity prices 
through scale economies, or improving quality by the diversification of the service 
(scope economies). (Economides, 1995) Moreover, the development of networks 
leads to positive effects on the overall economy. As the complete amount of costs 
and benefits is not fully taken into account for the market equilibrium, the private 
equilibrium does not coincide with the social optimum. (Coase, 1960) Public 
intervention is therefore necessary.  
2.1.1 Club effects 
The definition of club effects was first established by Buchanan (1965) for those 
goods and services by which consumption utility depends on the number of users. In 
the case of club goods, individuals increase their utility as the number of adherents is 
growing (up to the saturation point beyond which club effects are not acting anymore). 
Katz and Shapiro (1985) noted that user’s satisfaction increases with the expected 
future size of the network. So, an expected bigger network provides a higher 









































8In particular, club effects constrain the dynamics of the network development. 
Network externalities are the source for increasing returns in the adoption, which 
means that the spread of network goods does not follow a linear path, but rather an 
S-curve (Figure 1). Multiple stable equilibriums are therefore possible, depending on 
whether the critical mass is attained or not. Hence, club effects can explain the rapid 
diffusion of the network as well as its failure when it can not reach the critical mass 
and spread out from there. (Arthur, 1989; David, 1985) 






Maturity stage  Earlier stage 
 
The spread of a network usually follows a succession of three different stages: (i) a 
slow start period until a minimum level is reached (critical mass); (ii) once the critical 
mass is reached, the "installed basis" membership increases the attractiveness of the 
network. The arrival of new users improves the network attractiveness contributing to 
more adhesions, in a feedback effect, conducing to a fast diffusion rate of the network; 
(iii) in the third stage, the potential for growth is exhausted, the network reaches the 
saturation point and the industry maturity is attained. (Shapiro and Varian, 1998) 
Diffusion and survival of the network depends on whether the critical mass is reached 
or not. So, promoters of a new network should aim to reach the critical level as a 
minimum target, which must be achieved in one jump step. Otherwise, the only 
stable equilibrium will be the absence of the network. (Curien, 2000; Economides, 
1994) 
2.1.2 The effects of scale and scope 
The high capital intensity of network industry is a source of many effects at the 
operational level that can be fully exploited by chain integration. We will consider two 
of those effects: scale economies and scope economies. Scale economies exist 
when the average production costs decrease with the scale of production or the 
production volumes. (Braeutigam, 1989)  
This feature is present in network industries such as telecommunications, electricity 
and natural gas. The development of networks often requires the establishment of a 
heavy technical structure requiring high initial investments that can not be easily 
deployed in another activity (sunk cost). The initial fixed costs are a source of 









































8final price. (Curien, 2000) Furthermore, the marginal cost of providing services is 
often constant or even decreasing for the relevant economic quantities. The bulk of 
the network being established, the adhesion of a new membership contributes to 
expand club effects and sharing costs more than increasing exploration costs. 
Scope economies are achieved by joint production of different goods or services, 
within the same company, through various production processes sharing a common 
input. In the presence of scope economies, producing n different goods or services 
separately becomes more expensive than producing them together given synergies 
in the production. (Baumol et al., 1982) 
Network industries are heavily influenced by scope economies. A large network can 
attract several related activities, therefore reinforcing its value. A recent example is 
the emergence of multi-utility companies proposing a multitude of services beyond 
their core business (telephone, internet, multi-energy contracts, etc.). This allows the 
utility to optimize their infrastructure, as well as to expand the range of services 
offered to the clients. 
2.1.3 The dynamic effects on the economy 
Endogenous growth theories defend that investing in public infrastructures such as 
transport infrastructure or energy networks, generates economic positive externalities. 
(Barro, 1990) Investment in infrastructure affects directly the product by increasing 
total investments, particularly because public investment can be seen as an 
additional production factor in the economy. On the other hand, new infrastructure 
generates positive externalities in terms of aggregate output of the economy. It 
allows for a more efficient functioning of markets, which benefits all businesses and 
citizens. Finally, investing in new infrastructure entails indirect effects for the 
economy through the increase of factors productivity (capital and labor). Even though 
public expenses in infrastructure can provoke a crowding out effect by decreasing 
demand of private factors, this also contributes to increasing their productivity. Hence, 
a reduction in costs and an increase in the overall production would be expected. 
2.2 Natural monopoly 
An industry operates in a natural monopoly situation if a single company produces 
with lower costs than a combination of smaller companies. (Braeutigam, 1989; 
Lévêque , 2004) In the case of the electric power industry, for example, the 
duplication of the transmission wires to serve the same consumer is not efficient. In 
this case, competition does not lead to a cost-effective solution and results rather in 
perverse effects in terms of price volatility. Therefore, a public intervention is 
necessary. 
The natural monopoly situation may have different sources, most of them related to 
technological externalities. It may be associated to strong scale economies (due to 
the importance of fixed costs, average costs decrease following the increase of the 
production); scope economies (related to variable costs and economies of joint 
production); and network economies (related to interconnection and system control); 









































8Efficiency can be severely affected in the case of stable natural monopoly 
(decreasing costs for all relevant quantities). Even though monopoly can still produce 
more efficiently than in an atomized market, it will maximize profits by pricing higher 
and offering fewer quantities as compared to the collective optimum situation. 
(Lévêque, 2004) In this context, the public authority must intervene in order to 
increase the social surplus. It can take one of the two modalities: regulating the 
private monopoly or replacing it by a public monopoly. (Angelier, 2007) 
2.3 The problem of building and expanding private networks  
An important characteristic of network industries is ubiquity. (Angelier, 2007) As for 
hydrogen, consumers will purchase a stationary appliance such as a small fuel cell 
co-generating power and heat (CHP), if there is an infrastructure, sufficiently large, 
capable of bringing hydrogen to their front door. On the other hand, they might be 
interested in purchasing a hydrogen car when they can easily find a hydrogen station 
in town as well as on the way to the beach during their long trips.  
In search of a maximization behavior, private societies are motivated to focus only in 
mass consumption areas. Besides, expanding their networks might not be profitable, 
and interconnections with neighbor networks can increase the competition which 
ultimately is not of interest. In our example, setting hydrogen stations in rural areas 
(non premium locations) is a determinant for hydrogen attractiveness, but investors 
may not be interested in it, at least, in the beginning of the transition.  
When networks are built by private companies, the problem may not be to start local 
networks in highly profitable areas, but it is rather the coordination of the investments 
and the interconnection of the networks. Noam (1992) noticed a similar problem in 
the history of the telephone networks development. 
Figure 2 Stages in the network expansion 
(n)











































































8Source: Noam, 1992.  
According to Noam’s model, the initial cost of the network is too heavy to be shared 
among users. So, the network can not start without an external support. After 
reaching critical mass size (n1), it enters a period of self sustained growth. It means 
that private societies find it economical to expand their networks to new entrants 
mainly because of the scale economies and club effects. They will keep expanding 
the network until reaching the size that maximizes their profits (n2), where the 
difference between the private utility [u(n)] and the average cost curve [c(n)/n] is 
maximal. After the private optimum, the private marginal benefits of expanding the 
network are inferior to the marginal expansion costs (saturation, complexity costs, 
etc.), and therefore privates are no more interested in expanding the network. 
However, in a social perspective, the network should be expanded, since the 
collective utility from the last member arrived--measured by the addition of its utility 
and the utility increment for the other members of the network [u(n)+u’(n)]--is still 
above the marginal cost. There is a tension between the interest of public authorities 
in promoting the network development and the interest of private societies installing it. 
Considering the public authority is successful in convincing privates in expanding 
their network, and it is interested in universal access, later on companies are not 
willing to develop the network after the point where they start making losses (n4 
where the average cost is not fully covered by the price). Any expansion from that 
point on can not be done without an external subsidy like in the beginning of the 
network.  
In conclusion, firstly, the network expands by economical and technical reasons but 
om the 1880s until the beginning of World War I; (ii) enlarging markets and 
the beginning of the electricity policy in the period between the two World wars; (iv) 
later the expansion becomes a matter of political choice. Moreover, it is difficult that 
national networks kick off and reach the critical mass without any public support.  
 
3. The historical development of the electricity and gas networks in 
Europe 
The following sections analyze the evolution of the electricity and natural gas in 
Europe. This analysis illustrates the effects of the network externalities on the 
development of those industries, as well as the role of public authorities and private 
agents on the process. Moreover, hydrogen introduction might have multiple 
interactions with both industries in the future, particularly with natural gas.    
3.1 The electricity industry  
The electricity industry emergence in the four main countries of Western Europe 
(Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain) began in the early 1880s. The period of 
major diffusion occurred between 1950 and 1980. The evolution of the electricity 
industry process can be decomposed in four distinct stages: (i) the emergence of the 
industry, fr
the operational harmonization and growth of domestic industries after World War II; 


































































Germany France Italy United Kingdom
 
Source : EIA, 2007 (AER 2006) ; Angelier and Lalanne, 1979. 
From the emergence of electricity in the Western European countries until the "take-
off," more than 60 years passed. Since the beginning, the evolution of the electric 
power industry has experienced different rhythms, paths and performances 
depending on the country. There were three main factors influencing the 
development of the national electricity industries: physic-economic country conditions; 
ment 
of the industry. (Angelier and Lalanne, 1979; Lanthier, 2006) 
The emergence of the electricity industry: 1880-1913 
Initially, the electric power industry was based on thermal and hydropower production. 
In the early years, the purpose of electricity was to convert thermal energy into a form 
of energy more suitable for certain energy needs such as lighting. Moreover, 
governments aimed to replace imported energy by maximizing national resources 
such as hydro. Until World War I, the main markets for electricity were lighting and 
traction. 
During the first stage, the power industry remains generally confined to major urban 
centers and industrial highly consuming areas, where consumption is spread over the 
whole day. The industry structure varies from one country to another: concentrated in 
ighly  oncentrated in 
major consumer centers in France. (Bergougnoux, 2000; Stoffaës, 1994) The 
The second stage corresponds to the period between the two World wars. During this 
s in transportation and 
production. From now on, electricity can be transported over long distances and in 
the origins of the capital; and the implication of public authorities in the develop
Germany and Italy; atomized in the United Kingdom; and h c
German electric industry is the most developed as compared to other electricity 
industries in terms of electricity production, costs and electricity prices, 
geographically widespread network and diversification of the production mix. 
(Angelier and Lalanne, 1979) 
The enlargement period: 1918-1938 
stage, the electricity industry had realized substantial progres
more economical conditions. This allowed for a geographic expansion of local 









































8interconnection of various regional electricity grids. The expansion of the market is 
also associated to the growth of the production scale and the introduction of new 
power generation technologies (e.g. turbine). It improves the efficiency in the use of 
the fuel in the generating station, which allowed for substantial price reductions at the 
consumption (e.g. constant prices were divided by a factor of 5 in Paris between 
d to the electric motor ability to replace the steam 
engine in industrial use. 
The growth of the national electricity industries: 1945 - 1980 
rent factors explain 
the decision to nationalize the industry: the strategic importance of the electric power 
the industry through a process of gradual redemption of 
financial investments in electricity companies. By contrast, in the former West 
tric holdings to 
private companies, particularly to financial groups. 
d the production and the investment costs. On the other hand, demand 
growth globally slows down after the 1980s (e.g. in France, demand growth rates fell 
1914 and 1939). Therefore electricity becomes accessible to more and more persons 
and can finally progress over the niche markets. (Stoffaës, 1994) 
During this period, electricity energy integrates the country energy consumption and 
contributes to economic competitiveness and growth. Firstly, electric power was 
mainly used for industrial needs. Industrial demand accounts for more than two thirds 
of the electricity consumption (except in the United Kingdom where it provided only 
50%) between the World wars. (Angelier et Lalanne, 1979) In fact, the growth in 
electricity industries was linke
After World War II, the demand for electricity had progressed very fast. This 
progression was mainly driven by the demand of the residential and service sector. 
The share of the residential and service sector in the total demand rose from about 
one fifth in 1950 to one half in 1977. (EIA, 2007) The structural change in demand is 
due to the extension of the distribution networks covering a larger portion of the 
population, and to the increasing importance of the services sector in the western 
economies. 
In the face of a rapid growing demand and fragmented electricity networks, national 
organizations under increasing control of the State were created in Europe aiming to 
harmonize the operations and diffuse widely electrification. Diffe
industry in a framework of reconstructing economies needing more energy; technical 
change in production and transmission turned the electricity industry into a natural 
monopoly; the role of the electricity industry as an instrument of regulation and public 
intervention in the economy. (Angelier et Lalanne, 1979; Stoffaës, 1994) 
The electricity industry was nationalized in France and in the United Kingdom. In Italy, 
the State "nationalizes" 
Germany, the central government sold a part of its stake in public elec
The arrival to maturity and the deregulation period after the 1980s 
The two oil shocks in 1973 and 1978 and the subsequent stagflation crises in the 
western economies are in the basis of the strong deceleration in the power industry 
after the 1970s and 1980s. On the one hand, the fuel prices increase as well as the 
inflation raise
from more than 7% to 4% respectively in the period before and after 1881). (EIA, 
2007) Moreover, there were new plants entering in production by that time, which 









































8The electricity industry was first deregulated in the United States, where private 
companies are historically responsible of three quarters of the electricity produced 
and sold. (Stoffaës, 1994) In Europe, deregulation starts in Great Britain in 1991 with 
the restructuring followed by privatization of the electric integrated firms. The 
movement continued in the European continent in the framework of the creation of an 
internal market for energy. The process was mainly defined in two directives (in 1996 
igger consumers. The rhythm of 
liberalization is not homogenous among countries, alternating between competitive 
 and in 
the 
  Actors Production  Network 
and in 2003) which lay down the liberalization principles: the unbundling of the 
concurrence activities in production and retailing from the essential facility considered 
as a natural monopoly; third party access (TPA) to the networks; the creation of a 
regulator to survey the concurrence and the natural monopoly activity; and 
progressively opening the market starting with b
markets in Great Britain and Italy, and still highly concentrated in France
Germany. (Finon and Midttun, 2004)  
In conclusion, the electrification process was globally influenced by the intervention 
of public authorities. Depending on the network evolution stage (local, regional, 
national), a different hierarchical level of public administration intervenes in the 
process (municipalities, regions, State.) At each stage of the process, especially in 
countries where the private sector was important, there were tensions for the 
investment in the network: between the municipality and the local utility, at first; or the 
State and the multinational group, later. (Lanthier, 2006) The result was 
fragmentation of the electricity networks with different technical standards. After 
World War II, in the context of rapid increase in demand and a fragmentized network, 
the State integrated the entire chain in order to avoid growth bottlenecks (e.g. 
standardization of the technology), to maximize the benefits from club effects and 
scope economies, and to overcome the critical size more rapidly. This coincides with 
the strongest growth rates that electrical industry had ever known. Technical 
innovations in production and transmission were critical in the development of the 
industry at a national level. More recently, demand growth deceleration and network 
established, the disadvantages of vertical integration became clearer (bureaucratic 
organization inefficiencies or ‘X-inefficiencies,’ new technologies in production with 
low scale economies, etc.). The conditions were created for opening the industry to 
competition. 
Table 2 Summary of the historical development of the electric power industry in Europe since 
1880  
 Principal  Utilization
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3.2 The natura ndus
as in has   the to t gas  ped  
 century a d the first half of the twentieth century. The gas mains for the 
ere firstl  m nd ler  blic and private 
ame the first major outlets for the gas. In the late nineteenth century, this 
market was already threatened by the introduction of electric lighting. The 
 with e ty continued until the gas industry found its next impetus for 
alorific usage. In th ch re ess  
buted to concentrate the pro ction in more efficient large-sized plants, putting 
e crea e first transport networks at the regional level. (Paquier and 
05) No 1930  
ient to prev decline o manuf ue t scarc  
ition from electricity and petroleum. (Odell, 2001)  
 natural gas enc 95 s 
s appe  diffic t for the gas industry. Cleaner and having a 
ross calorific value, na  was also a cheap energy grace to the major 
deposit discoveries of the 1950s and the 1960s across Eu oreover, in the 
period after World War II, the European economic reconstruction required significant 
mounts of energy, which explains the authorities’ willingness to promote the new 
rst transmission and distribution networks 
by that time. The transportation networks kicked 
t Britain, the Gas Act 1948 
rds and the Gas Council 
l gas i try 
i The natural g
nineteenth















netheless, after the  s, production modernization was not




 emerg e in the 1 0s and 1960
ars in a ult contex
tural gas better g
rope.
  ii M
a
energy. (Angelier, 1994; Smit, 2006) The fi
of natural gas were built in Europe 
off linking the producing areas with the main consumption areas nearby. In large 
cities, the introduction of natural gas was facilitated by the town gas infrastructure 
already in place. (Angelier, 1994; Paquier and Williot, 2005) 
The resurgence of the gas industry is accompanied by an institutional change 
intended to facilitate the transition. The major national firms were created after World 
War II. In 1953, the Italian government created the national oil and gas company ENI 
(Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi) which reorganizes the sector by incorporating the firm in 
charge of the transportation and the distribution of natural gas, SNAM (Società 
Metanodotti Nazionale). In France, the nationalization law of electricity and gas 1946 
set up a national company for electricity (Electricité de France - EDF) and other for 
gas (Gaz de France - GDF). GDF results from the merger of the other gas companies, 
excluding mixed-capital and municipal companies. In Grea
nationalized the entire industry of town gas and divided it into a dozen area boards 
under coordination of the Gas Council. In 1973, the area boa
merged into the public company "British Gas Company." (The company was 
privatized and unbundled after 1986.) In 1963, the Dutch State in partnership with 
Exxon and Shell created Gasunie, the company responsible for production and 









































8Republic of Germany (FRG), the natural gas industry was developed in a more 
regional basis. The industry was composed by transporter/importer companies 
(Ruhrgas on the lead), regional transporters and local utilities (Stadtwerke), most of 
them public owned. The geographical demarcation contracts between transporters, 
as well as the concession contracts assigned to local utilities, created territorial 
monopolies preventing concurrence between firms. (Teece, 1990)  
Almost everywhere in Europe, public companies convert and modernize the old town 
gas network, interconnect regional networks and lay down transport networks for 
natural gas. 
The natural gas diffusion after the 1960s 
After the 1960s, natural gas has progressed very rapidly in the energy balances of 
the Western economies thanks to deposit discoveries and technical innovations in 
the pipelines construction (high pressure allowing for great distances transport). (See 
graph 2) 







1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Years
France Germany Italy
Netherlands United Kingdom USA
 
ix. In Europe, natural gas has the greatest weight, in Italy meeting about 
10% of total energy consumption. France and the Netherlands stand behind Italy in 
terms of penetration in the energy balance, while it is almost absent in the United 
Kingdom and Germany. 
Natural gas progressed very fast in the energy balances reaching 10% in 10-
15 years on average. This rapid penetration was possible grace to the quick network 
construction. Table 3 shows the rhythm of the transport pipeline construction in four 
European countries, between 1970 and 1990. 
Author’s calculations from BP (2007). 
In the early 1960s, the natural gas industry is taking off in Europe while in North 










































8Table 3 Length of high-pressure pipeline network in Europe (1,000 km) 
Country/year  1970 1975 1980  1990  1990/1970
France  15.8 18.4 23.6  30.1  1.91 
Germany  32.3 38.8 51.7  77.2  2.39 
Italy  8.5 10.7  15.1 23.1  2.72 
Netherlands  8.4 8.8 9.5 10.5 1.25 
United Kingdom  2.5 5.7  12.1 13.5 5.40 
Source: Estrada et al., 1995, p.321. 
The United Kingdom multiplied its transmission network length by a factor of 5 during 
the period 1970-1990, following the diffusion of the natural gas in the market as well 
as the rhythm of putting into production the wells discovered in the British shelf. In 
Germany and in Italy, the length of the transmission pipelines also progressed very 
fast during the period. In the case of the Netherlands, the main infrastructure was 
built right after the Groningen discovery, in the 1960s, and natural gas assumed a 
major role in the energy mix henceforth. (Smit, 2006) In France, the construction 
rhythm of the transmission pipelines was more stable compared to other countries, 
tural gas in the market. This is due primarily to 
the political engagement for nuclear in response to the oil crisis of the 1970s. 
ission. (Angelier, 1994) After the end of the 1970s, in the 
context of a “gas bubble,” prices and tariffs were deregulated and the industry was 
 were not enough to 
tly  re to 
bring gas from far locations. Those infrastructures were constructed between national 
gas producers-exporters and international consortiums formed by gas companies 
from European importing countries. ey we comp by the ture of 
long-term i indexation clauses to the crude oil price 
(to insure the competitiveness of the natural gas at the consumption) and obligation 
of consumption (clause “take or pay”). These clauses were meant to share the "price 
 the counterparts. This institutional architecture 
(oligopoly in production and importing activities; and closed national markets) 
ss has 
reflecting the smooth progression of na
Compared to the United States, the gas industry is historically more concentrated in 
Europe. In the United States, transport is traditionally organized within private 
monopolies under the control of the federal regulator, while distribution is generally a 
matter of municipal or private local distribution companies under the control of the 
State Public Utility Comm
restructured, separating the transport and the trading business. Therefore the 
networks were opened to producers and consumers, which had lead to the 
development of spot markets at gas hubs. (MacAvoy, 2001 ; Teece, 1990) 
In Europe, companies had soon found that domestic reserves
supply dem o it  cess  build  the growing  and, s was ne ary to  a cos infrastructu
  iii Th re ac anied   signa
mport contracts (20-25 years) with 
risk" and the "market risk" between
enabled the development of stable and mature European supplies. (Odell, 2001) 
The changing institutional framework after the 1990s 
The integrated structures have been challenged by the liberalization organized 
around two gas directives (Directive 98/30 of June 1998 and Directive 2003/55 of 
June 2003). They have introduced the principles of the unbundling of the vertically 
integrated companies between the competitive activities (in the production and retail) 
and the essential facility (transport), the third-party access to networks and the 









































8been recorded (i.e. the time and scope of the contracts has been reduced), markets 
are still far from a complete concurrence situation. Where former gas incumbents 
were not unbundled, they are still dominating the market (e.g. France, Italy, 
Germany). (Finon and Midttun, 2004) Furthermore, as domestic resources are 
becoming scarcer in the context of a rising demand, the European gas market has to 
rely in more foreign gas which raises security of supply concerns, as well as the need 
of investing in new infrastructure to bring that gas (which is an important issue to be 
solved by public and private agents in the coming years.)   
In conclusion, the gas experience in Europe is an illustration of the market weakness 
The diffusion of electricity benefitted from the wide recognition of its technological 
 control were created in the 
to manage the development of national networks. While the town gas industry was 
generally limited to a local level, the natural gas industry was developed at a national 
(and international) scale. In the early years, the States integrated the natural gas 
business in national companies in order to generate scale, scope and system 
economies, and therefore developing this industry quickly. In a competitive 
environment, such as in the case of the town gas, the search for a solvent demand in 
order to maximize the return on investments is often done without taking into account 
network externalities and long-term investment needs. (Angelier, 2007, p.65; Noam, 
1992) This behavior limits the network development at the national level. Public 
intervention is then necessary to enlarge the networks, particularly to interconnect 
fragmented networks creating a large national one.  
 
4. Prospects for the hydrogen transition based on the electricity and gas 
experience 
Both electricity and natural gas reached a critical mass after which their market 
shares started to increase rapidly grace to network externalities. The natural gas 
diffusion benefited from the availability of the town gas infrastructure in the cities, and 
from local discoveries after the 1950s. Electricity developed quickly due to the high 
voltage transmission and the turbine introduction after the 1920s. In both cases, they 
started as decentralized networks that were interconnected to form regional networks, 
and then national systems. Electricity took about 60 years before reaching the critical 
mass and diffusing widely. Town gas failed to become a national energy, and it was 
replaced by natural gas which needed just a few decades to be diffused in the major 
European countries. 
superiority in lighting and other household appliances. The superiority of the electric 
motor as compared to steam engine was decisive for increasing the electric 
consumption in the industry sector, which was the main driver of the electricity 
progression during the first half of the XXth century. Technical progresses in 
production and in transmission made electricity cheaper and more available, creating 
therefore the conditions for the network development at the national level. Technical 
progress was also important in the case of natural gas. In fact, without progress in 
the steel industry--particularly in pipeline construction--the network widespread would 
not be possible. 
In both cases the government backed the establishment of the supporting 









































8electricity industry charged to the operational harmonization and to growing the 
network coverage. In the case of natural gas, national companies were formed in 
See Table 4 for a synthesis) It is true that natural gas benefited from a 
favorable circumstance (local discoveries, growing energy demand, the old town gas 
frastructure deployment. 
order to organize the local production and to build up the infrastructures needed to 
serve users. (
infrastructure, etc.). Nevertheless, we can raise the following question: was the 
diffusion of natural gas in Europe relatively quicker because of the early State 
intervention?   
The development of energy networks requires huge investments with long delays of 
recuperation of the capital before they can reach the critical mass and diffuse by the 
mean of network externalities and scale economies. In this context, it is unlikely that 
private companies will invest alone in infrastructure needed to widespread the 
hydrogen use at a national level. The intervention of the State is therefore necessary 
to support the early in




























Electricity --  +  ++  . ++  - --  60  * 
Natural Gas  --  .  .  ++  +  -  ++  15 ** 
Hydrogen --  -  -  -- ++  - +  . 
 (++): strong advantage; (+): advantage; (.): even or not applicable; (-) disadvantage; (--) serious barrier. 
 * before reaching the “tipping point”; ** average number of the years before reaching 10 % of the national energy mix in the   
European countries surveyed in the paper.  
The introduction of hydrogen needs both the availability of infrastructure and 
technology. As for hydrogen technologies, particularly fuel cells and onboard storage 
lopment and demonstration R&DD); secondly, to support the market-
entry and infrastructure investments; and finally, to internalize the environmental and 
onstration projects at the local level 
could accelerate the transition.   
 
devices, they are being developed by public and private partnerships around the 
world. Progresses have been recently announced particularly in terms of durability 
and reliability of the fuel cell. However, the competitive level is still far from being 
reached and the research and development (R&D) period has been taking decades 
without any significant entry in the market. (IEA, 2005; Lattin and Utgikar, 2007) 
Introducing a radical innovation—such as hydrogen and fuel cells--in the market 
needs public intervention at three levels: firstly, to support the pre-market stages in 
order to make hydrogen technologies competitive with conventional technologies 
(research, deve
social externalities in order to level the “playing field” of the competition with 
traditional technologies and thus creating conditions for the market diffusion. 
(Bourgeois and Mima, 2003)  
In the actual liberalized European framework and considering financial burdens faced 










































Natural gas and electricity in Europe, as well a co l a of
hydrogen infrastructure, generally converge to the h tructure starts in 
densely populated areas, with a huge demand potential, in a decentralized 
production configuration and further evolves towards a centralized production 
f cost w y, the
i  
investment and the uncertainty about the demand uptake make it unlikely that private 
t by: 







nalysis   the 
ollowing the expansion of the demand. Even if estimated at a least- a  
nfrastructure is projected to cost several billions of euros. This huge amount of
agents deploy alone the necessary infrastructure to overcome the “chicken-or-egg” 
dilemma. The same problem occurred in the past when the State felt a strategic 
necessity to develop energy networks such as pipelines and power grids. There were 
also economical reasons for the State to build these networks on its own, such as 
scale economies, scope economies, club effects, and economic growth.  
Public authorities have an important role to play during the hydrogen transition. They 
can improve the context for the introduction of hydrogen into the marke
supporting R&DD; economic instruments (e.g. carbon taxe); command and control 
policies (e.g. efficiency requirements, renewable energy obligation); public education; 
and codes and standards for hydrogen technologies. Moreover, historical review of 
the electricity and natural gas diffusion points out the importance of public 
intervention in the network diffusion. 
Considering (i) the likely path of the transition (starting from small local networks); (ii) 
the new role of the States in the economy as a regulator more than intervener; and 
(iii) the financial constraints o
authorities and industry can be very important for the transition by reducing 
uncertainty and, therefore, accelerating equipment deployment (such as fuel cell 
cars), while at the same time helping to ramp up investments in the infrastructure. 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
i  Demonstration projects of hydrogen for transportation in Europe: http://www.h2moves.eu/ . Worldwide 
demonstration projects atlas http://www.iphe.net/newatlas/atlas.htm (300 projects surveyed). 
ii Between 1938 and 1952, natural gas was discovered in the Po Valley, Italy. In 1951, the Lacq deposits were 
found in France, and the Slochteren in Groningen (Netherlands), in 1959. In 1965, the reservoir West Sole was 
ber of exporters, for the most 
discovered in the British side of the North Sea. In 1969, the reservoir Ekofisk was discovered in the Norwegian 
continental shelf of the North Sea. 
iii Natural gas production is traditionally concentrated in the hands of a small num
public companies: Algeria (Sonatrach), Norway (Statoil), Russia (Gazprom) and the Netherlands (Gasunie). 
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